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全球-零售业-全球体育用品入门:论零售业进攻——全球策略

 

 Global

 Sporting

 Goods

 Primer

 On

 the

 Retail

 Offense:

 Global

 Ways

 To

 Play

 Global Equity Research 14

 September

 2020

 In the last few years, all major global sporting goods companies have upped their

 game

 to

 grow

 owned

 retail,

 making

 it

 a

 strategic

 growth

 cornerstone. Near-term,

  COVID-19

  has

  further

  accelerated

  this

  shift,

  particularly

  e- commerce

  growth

 and

  penetration,

  which

  so

  far

  does

  not

  seem

  to

  be significantly moderating. Qualitatively, the acceleration of global brands DTC is

 instrumental

 for

 customer

 engagement/acquisition,

 storytelling,

 and

 brand control

  while

  quantitatively

  positive

  for

  top

  and

  bottom-line

  financial algorithms, which we outline herein. All-in, we maintain our positive stance on the Global Sporting Goods sector with Overweight-rated Nike (raising price target to $136), Puma, Lululemon, and VFC our top ways to play.  Direct, direct, direct. From historically being an industry heavily skewed to wholesale distribution, DTC expansion has become in the last 3-5 years one

  of

  the

  cornerstones

  of

  the

  sports

  brands

  multi-year

  strategies. Specifically,

 owned

 retail

 (stores

 +

 e-commerce)

 has

 increased

 on average

 from 25% of sales in FY15 to 33% in FY19

 with our

 models pointing to c. 45% penetration over the next three years. E-commerce in particular

 has

 been

 growing

 significantly,

 on

 average

 posting

 growth

 in excess of 30%, and accelerated strongly in recent quarters (albeit boosted by lockdowns), with most brands posting online growth in the very high double digits to low triple digits.  A

 boost

 for

 the

 global

 athletic

 brands

 and

 financial

 algorithms.

 DTC expansion

 has

 several

 positive

 strategic

 implications,

 namely

 enhancing direct consumer engagement and allowing stronger brand control. This shift though

 has also

 meaningful

 financial implications. We

 estimate

 the

 shift should contribute on average c. 350bps of additional topline growth this year and over 100bps p.a. over the next few years, more fully capturing the retail mark-up even on the same units sold. Similarly, the ongoing shift

 should

 also

 continue

 to

 lead

 to

 better

 GMs,

 better

 EBITs,

 and possibly

 better

 returns

 on

 capital

 employed.

 Overall,

 this

 shift

 should therefore be a

 positive support to earnings growth over the next few years and valuations. See our detailed financial analysis inside this note with all calculations available upon request.

 Equity

 Ratings

 and

 Price

 Targets

 European

 General

 Retail Chiara

 Battistini

 AC

 (44-20)

 7134-5417

 chiara.x.battistini@jpmorgan.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 Securities

 plc

 Georgina

 Johanan,

 ACA

 (44-20)

 7134-5791

 georgina.s.johanan@jpmorgan.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 Securities

 plc

 Philip

 Spain

 (44-20)

 7742-6370

 philip.spain@jpmorgan.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 Securities

 plc

 Ipsita

 Singh

 (91-22)

 6157-3339

 ipsita.singh@jpmchase.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 India

 Private

 Limited

 Luxury

 &

 General

 Retail

 Team Head

 Melanie

 Flouquet,

 ACA

 (39-02)

 8895-2133

 melanie.a.flouquet@jpmorgan.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 Securities

 plc

 North

 America

 Retailing

 – Department

 Stores

 &

 Specialty Softlines

 Matthew

 R.

 Boss,

 CPA

 AC

 (1-212)

 622-2630

 matthew.boss@jpmorgan.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 Securities

 LLC

 Grace

 Smalley,

 CFA

 (1-212)

 622-4894

 grace.smalley@jpmorgan.com

 J.P.

 Morgan

 Securities

 LLC

 Sector

 Specialist

 (Sales

 &

 Trading) contact

 details:

 Temi

 Ladega

 -

 Sales

 and

 Trading

 (44-20)

 7134-2654

 temi.ladega@jpmorgan.com

 Company

  Ticker

 Mkt

 Cap ($

 mn)

 Price CCY

  Price

  RatCur

 ing

  Prev

  Cur

 Price

 TaEnd Date

 rget

 Prev

  End

  Date

 adidas

 Group

 ADS

 GR

 63,411.58

 EUR

 271.60

 N

 n/c

 225.00

 Dec-21

 n/c

 n/c

 lululemon

 athletica

 inc.

 LULU

 US

 41,159.70

 USD

 313.39

 OW

 n/c

 387.00

 Dec-21

 n/c

 n/c

 NIKE,

 Inc.

 NKE

 US

 188,505.00

 USD

 118.00

 OW

 n/c

 136.00

 Dec-21

 118.00

 n/c

 Puma

 PUM

 GR

 12,683.06

 EUR

 71.82

 OW

 n/c

 77.00

 Dec-21

 n/c

 n/c

 Under

 Armour,

 Inc.

 UAA

 US

 5,124.06

 USD

 11.32

 N

 n/c

 12.00

 Dec-21

 n/c

 n/c

 V.F.

 Corporation

 VFC

 US

 27,287.12

 USD

 70.03

 OW

 n/c

 74.00

 Dec-21

 n/c

 n/c

 Source:

 Company

 data,

 Bloomberg,

 J.P.

 Morgan

 estimates.

 n/c

 =

 no

 change.

 All

 prices

 as

 of

 11

 Sep

 20.

  See page 38 for analyst certification and important disclosures, including non-US analyst disclosures. J.P. Morgan does and seeks to do business with companies covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. www.jpmorganmarkets.com

 Chiara

 Battistini (44-20)

 7134-5417

 chiara.x.battistini@jpmorgan.com

 Matthew

 R.

 Boss,

 CPA (1-212)

 622-2630

 matthew.boss@jpmorgan.com

 Global

 Equity

 Research

 14

 September

 2020

  Breaking

 down

 the

 USA

 players.

 We

 see

 NKE

 and

 VFC

 as

 the

 largest beneficiaries from the sector’s ongoing shift to DTC w/ LULU notably already benefitting from its fully DTC business model. Specifically, our calculations point to the potential for

 the shift to add annually at least 100-150bps to revenue growth, ~40-60bps to GPM expansion and ~300-400bps to EBIT dollar growth each year to both NKE and VFC on our math. On margins, we

 see

 the

 opportunity

 for

 medium-term

 margin

 expansion

 to

 mid-teens

  or+200-300bps margin opportunity vs. low-double-digit margins exiting 2019 (& high-teens

  longer

  term)

  embedding

  low-to-mid-twenties

  digital

  margins, materially below LULU’s 40%+ direct margins. To that point, LULU’s online margins of 40%+ are structurally driven by higher average order value, higher apparel mix (=higher gross margins), and lower geographical diversification (= lower

 distribution

 costs)

 as

 well

 as

 lower

 marketing

 costs

 (less sponsorship/athlete orientated) in our view. Importantly, our financial analysis supports recent mgmt. access (see NKE 7/28 Mgmt Access Takeaways & 10-K Tidbits; Reiterate Overweight and VFC 8/14 CEO/CFO Roadshow = Increased Confidence In

 Top &

 Bottom-Line

 Algo; OW). Specifically,

 both

 Nike

 and VFC

  mgmt.

  cited

  “increased

  confidence”

  in

  go

  forward

  earnings algorithms driven by the accelerated shift to financially accretive digital w/ every

 ~10

 points

 of

 incremental

 online

 growth

 relative

 to

 plan

 (i.e.

 +20- 25%

 growth

 at

 NKE

 and

 +24-25%

 for

 VFC)

 equating

 to

 an

 incremental +40-60bps

  of

  revenue/EBIT

  dollar

  growth

  incorporating

  +15-30bps additional GPM expansion on our math.  Digging deeper into the European players. adidas has so far well delivered on its DTC shift, in

 our view, raising its

 ecommerce targets twice in the last years,

 and

 overall

 continuing

 to

 invest

 effectively

 on

 this

 channel.

 Going forward, it should continue to see significant financial impacts from the digital shift, with c. 120bps and c. 45bps support to topline and GM p.a., respectively. Puma, coming from a smaller retail exposure, and still growing strongly also in wholesale,

 has seen so

 far a

 more

 minute benefit. With DTC though

 gaining weight within the Group, and reaching a critical scale, we estimate the financial contribution to accelerate to c. 140bps of extra topline growth p.a and around 55bps p.a. of GM support between 2021 and 2023, slightly higher than adidas. With

 also

 currently

 stronger

 product

 momentum

 and

 management

 execution, we continue to prefer Puma over adidas for the time being.

  Table of Contents Distribution Strategies in Flux

 ..................................................................................... 4 The Financial Benefits of the DTC Shift

 ..................................................................... 8 The Enablers of the DTC Boost

 ................................................................................ 15 Some Thoughts on Wholesale Distribution

 ............................................................... 22 Upcoming Catalysts; NKE 1Q21 Preview ................................................................. 23 Investment Thesis, Valuation and Risks

 .................................................................... 27

  Distribution Strategies in Flux From historically an industry skewed to wholesale … Sporting goods has always been a sector heavily skewed to the wholesale channel including specialty store chains, department stores, independents sport stores or even general apparel stores. Brands were focused on the product, on bringing innovation to the sector and driving communication with consumers to build and support brand equity. On the other hand, distribution and customer reach were outsourced to third party retailers, able to provide the brands with a larger reach to a customer that usually shopped by product/category rather than by brand.

 Within owned retail, the main focus for the brands has been until relatively recently, flagship stores, to promote and support brand equity, and factory outlets. The latter, in sporting goods, is not just a channel to clear excess inventories but a profitable channel the brands actually manufacture for (as products made for outlets can actually carry higher gross margins than main product lines).

 Figure 1: Sales Exposure by Channel in 2015 100%

 80%

 60%

 40%

 20%

 0%

  Puma

  Nike

  adidas

  VF Corp

  Under Armour Lululemon Retail Wholesale

  Other

 Source:

 Company

 reports

 and

 J.P.

 Morgan

 estimates.

 Note:

 Nike

 “Other”

 includes

 Global

 Brands,

 Converse,

 and

 Corporate.

 Under

 Armour

 “Other”

 includes

 Connected

 Fitness

 and

 Licensing.

  …to a growing focus on DTC, becoming an increasingly important cornerstone of brands’ strategies In the last few years, all major global sporting goods companies have upped their game to grow owned retail, making it a cornerstone of their strategic plans and priorities.

 In fact, since adidas’ CMD in 2015 that introduced the ‘Creating the New’, we have been increasingly hearing about the brand’s intentions to pus...

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