下面是小编为大家整理的美国中央银行如何社交媒体上幸存【精选推荐】,供大家参考。
Con te n ts About the authors
.................................................................................................................. 3 Statement of independence
................................................................................................... 3 Acknowledgements
............................................................................................................... 3 Abstract
................................................................................................................................. 4 Introduction
.......................................................................................................................... 5 The Fed on Twitter: An overview
.......................................................................................... 6 The Fed’s engagement on Twitter
............................................................................................. 10 The Board is generally less engaged on Twitter than cabinet-level departments, but more engaged than other independent agencies
............................................................. 11 The Board’s engagement on Twitter is similar to other central banks
........................... 14 Twitter users discuss the Fed more than other central banks, around the same amount as other major federal regulatory agencies
..................................................................... 16 The Board of Governors garner greater negative reactions than do other federal agencies and peer nations’ central banks
............................................................................. 18 The Trump effect
................................................................................................................. 19 President Trump amplifies the conversation on Twitter regarding the Fed
.................. 19 President Trump’s tweets critiquing the Fed elicit a larger, more favorable response than his other tweets
....................................................................................................... 21 Policy implications
.............................................................................................................. 22 Conclusion
........................................................................................................................... 23
AB O U T
T H E
AU T H O R S
Peter
C onti -Br own is
an
Ass i st an t Prof es s or
at T he
W harton
Sc hool
o f t he
Univer sity o f Penns y l v a- nia
and
a
Nonresiden t F ellow
in
Ec onomi cs St udie s, t he
Broo k ings
I n st i tut ion . Br i a n D . Fein stei n is
an
Ass i st an t Prof e ss or
at T he
W harton
Sc hool
o f t he
Uni v ersi ty of Penn sy l v a- nia
ST A TEME N T
OF
I ND EPE ND E NC E T he
au t hor s did
no t recei v e
f inan c ial
s upport
f rom
any
f irm
or
per s on
f or
t his
ar t icle
or
f rom
an y f irm or
person
wi t h
a
f inan c ial
or
politi c al
intere st in
t his
art icle.
Nei t her
is
c urrentl y an
off icer , direc tor, or board
m ember
of any
organiza t ion
w it h
an
intere st in
t his
art i c le.
ACKN OWLE D GEME N TS W e
gratef ully
a ck nowledge
Ty ler
Knox
and
M ar k Sht rakhman
f or
e xc ellen t resear c h
as s is t ance , and to Shawn
Z ameche k a t W harton
Computing
f or
invaluable
as s i st an c e
ob t aining
da t a
f rom
T w itter.
AB ST RAC T In the last generation, the Federal Reserve launched a “quiet revolution” in how
i t approaches
c om- munic at ion . M o st o f t he
t ool s t hat
t he
F ed
use s t o
c ommunic at e , howe ver, have
remained
relativel y stat i c and
indi ff eren t t o
rapid
t e c hnological
c hange : s pee c hes , c ongres s ional
t e st imony , pre ss c on- f erences
and
s elec t in t erview s, and
t he
like . T his
wh it e
paper
under t ake s t he
f irs t syst emati c anal ys i s of the Fed’s participation on Twitter, a medium of increasing importance to public policy discussions. W e
also
analy z e
how
Pres ident
Donald
T rump , one
of t he
m os t prolifi c u s ers
o f t he
m edium , has influenced
c onver sat ion s abou t t he
F ed
on
T wi tt er .
U s ing
s e v eral
large
da t as ets— including
a
dat a set c on t aining
one
per cent of all
t weet s
publi s hed worldwide —we reach several novel conclusions. Most prominently, we find that the Fed’s Board of Gov ernors
is
m ore
engaged
on
T w itt er
t han
ot her
independe nt agencie s, but le ss t han
e x ecu t ive departments ; t hat
o t her
T w itt er
u s ers
engage
t he
F ed
m ore
negati v ely
t han
t hey
do
o t her
c en t ral bank s and
f ederal
agencies ; t hat
Pres iden t T rump
amplified
t he
c on v ersa t ion
on
T wi tt er
regarding the Fed; and that the President’s tweets criticizing the Fed elicited a larger, more favorable response than his other tweets. We conclude with suggestions on improving the Fed’s presence on Twitter, part icularly
a t t he
F ederal
Re s erve
Regional
Bank s, and
di sc u ss t he
way s t hat
politi c al
c onver sat ion s on
T wi tt er
m a y in f luence
F ed
c ommuni cat ion
strat egies .
Intro duction
Since 1994, the Federal Reserve has launched—or, in many cases, been shoved into—an era of more open communication. Before 1994, the Fed would not even publish the results of its interest-rate decisions, leaving the news to percolate through market activity. Central bankers cultivated an aura of mystique, focused on opacity in communication. Fed Chair- man Alan Greenspan nurtured this image with particular enthusiasm. “If I turn out to be particularly clear,” he famously said in 1988, “you"ve probably misunderstood what I said.” 1
At the behest of Congress and nudged by other central banks’ practices, the Fed changed: not only does it now release the details of its decisions, the Fed holds a press conference after every such meeting, releases a Summary of Economic Projections that contains pro- jections
of
key
economic
indicators
from
the
participants
on
the
Federal
Open
Market Committee, makes FOMC members available for interviews with reporters, and engages in a variety of other once unheard-of mechanisms to ensure greater transparency and clarity. When the Fed recently reevaluated its monetary policy framework, it did so only after four- teen meetings convened as part of a campaign the central bank called “Fed Listens.” These changes, once called a “quiet revolution” by former central banker and prominent advocate for greater Fed transparency Alan Blinder, have become rather noisy. 2
In the Trump era, conversations about the Fed became noisier, still. On April 16, 2018, Donald Trump tweeted his first critique of the Federal Reserve’s monetary policy as Presi- dent: that, while other countries are “playing the Currency Devaluation game,” the U.S. “keeps raising interest rates,” which is “Not acceptable!” 3 .
Dozens of critical tweets—many directly aimed personally at Fed Chair Jerome Powell—would follow. “As usual, Powell let us down,” Trump tweeted a few months later. 4
Powell made “TWO enormous mistakes,” 5 he is “clueless,” 6 exhibits a “horrendous lack of vision.” 7 By August 2019, Trump asked “who is our bigger enemy, Jay Powell or Chairman Xi?” 8
Many
viewed
these tweets
as
an
affront to the norms of central bank
independence,
an effort to politicize the
work
of the Fed
for
partisan
political ends.
But did
these critical tweets from the President matter?
. . . 1. F loyd
Norri s, W ha t i f th e
F ed
Chie f S pea ks P lainl y, N.Y. T ime s, Oct. 28 , 2005 , h ttps:// www .ny- tim e s. com / 2005 / 10 /2 8 /b usine ss/ wha t -if-the-fed-chie f -spea ks- plainl y. h t ml
2. A lan
S. B linder , T he
Q uie t Revolution : Cen t ral
B anking
G oe s M odern
( 2004) .
3. h tt p s:// twi tt er .c om /r ealdonald t rump /status/9 85858100149309441?lang = en
4. h tt p s:// twi tt er .c om /r ealdonald t rump /status/1 156666164732473345?lang = en
5. h tt p s:// twi tt er .c om /r ealdonald t rump /status/1 161687635426983937?lang = en
6. h tt p s:// twi tt er .c om /r ealdonald t rump /status/1 161719409804808193?lang = en
7. h tt p s:// twi tt er .c om /r ealdonald t rump /status/1 163472272612626433?lang = en
8. h tt p s:// twi tt er .c om /r ealdonald t rump /status/1 164914610836783104
This paper seeks to connect these two discussions—about the Fed’s efforts to increase its communications and the president’s use of Twitter to attack the Fed’s monetary policy de- cisions—by focusing on how the Fed uses Twitter, a relatively new and surprisingly power- ful medium on which officials communicate directly with citizens, reporters break news, and ordinary people across the globe engage in direct conversation with each other. While other scholars have assessed the impact of Twitter on interest rates, 9 and central bank com- munications have become a growing area of other scholarly concern, 10 this is the first effort of which we are aware to document how the Fed uses Twitter and how Twitter users—es- pecially President Trump—engage the Fed.
The effort produces three key findings. First, we identify patterns of usage among Federal Reserve entities and compare these patterns to those at other agencies and central banks. We learn that the Fed’s Reserve Banks are more prolific users of Twitter than the
Fed’s Board of Governors (Board), but the Board has higher engagement with Twitter users. The Fed,
as a whole, is
also an
average Twitter
user
compared to other
central banks, more active than other independent agencies, but less than executive departments.
Second, Twitter users don’t generally like the Fed. That is, although Twitter users discuss the Fed about as much as other major federal regulatory agencies, that discussion is likely more negative (using the Twitter “ratio” as a loose proxy for negativity).
And third, President Trump’s Twitter campaign against the Fed has been good for the Pres- ident’s Twitter account and bad for the Federal Reserve. The President’s tweets amplify discuss...